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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1970s most industrialized countries
have been facing serious structural adjustment problems in the
steel sector, which can be attributed mainly to two reasons. On
the one hand, declining demand in industrialized countries caused
overcapacities in their domestic production, while, on the other
hand, NICs began to catch up in heavy industries, thus steadily
penetrating the world steel market, which increasingly became a
buyers' market .
The immediate response of the industrialized nations was a new
wave of protectionism and subsidization, as in all instances
questions of national interests and politics were involved. How-
ever, in the case of the steel crisis these measures were not
only applied with respect to declining industries, as they per-
sist in industrialized countries. Following the infant industry
argument, governments in NICs rendered considerable support to
their steel industries.
As a result, trade in steel products cannot be regarded as the
outcome of a free market process, since supply side factors are
dominated by political decisions. The vicious circle of cumu-
lative^ subsidization and subsequent retaliation through pro-
tectionism .has led to a competition between national governments
;•; 2
both in developed ^nd developing countries .
The figures in Table 1 show the subsidy content embodied in steel
supply to the US market, as it has been determined by the U.S.
International Trade Commission for a number of major producer
countries. Only in West Germany, Korea and Luxembourg subsidy
margins keep below 10 percent. In Brazil and Spain subsidies
reach levels well beyond 35 percent. Since the steel sector en-
compasses a wide range of rather heterogenous products, there is
also a need to sketch the extent of subsidization for specific
products. On the whole, more simple and commodity-like steel
products, i.e. hot-rolled products, tend to be more heavily sub-- 2 -
Table 1: Subsidies as investigated by the US Department of Commerce on the US
Market in 1982
Country Number of Products Subsidy Margin
































Source: Jones (1986), p. 79.- 3 -
sidized than special steel products such as welded pipes and
tubes.
All these distortions in world steel markets seriously affect the
potential export performance of newly industrializing countries
such as Brazil which have put an emphasize on the development of
their •national steel industries. Whether this emphasize on steel
is in line with export-oriented industrialization cannot, how-
ever, be answered in general, since the structure of steel ex-
ports and protectionist treatment of particular countries differ
considerably. For this reason, the focus of this paper is on
Brazil.
The effects of steel protectionism in the USA and the European
Community (EC) on steel producing NICs has already been tackled
in a recent study by Tarr (198 7) for the case of South Korea. The
underlying static three-country-model clearly shows the welfare
losses in South Korea, the EC and the USA under alternative quota
and tariff arrangements in industrialized countries. However,
steel is treated as a homogeneous product in the simulation ex-
periments. This study assesses steel protectionism and its
effects on Brazilian export at a disaggregated level. Further-
more, the focus is on the impact on Brazilian exports rather than
welfare effects.
In the second section, Brazil's steel export opportunities on the
markets of the three major trading blocs are assessed. For this
purpose, the main-stream protectionist measures in the USA, Japan
and the EC are surveyed. Thereafter, section 3 considers the
consequences of these policies, especially subsidization, on
Brazil's export performance in other countries, in which it has
to compete with subsidized exports. The implications of multi-
lateral trade negotiations will be briefly sketched in section 4.
It has to be noted that the analysis is restricted to protec-
tionist tendencies prevailing in the 1980s. Hence, the impli-
cations of long-term processes of substitution as well as busi-
ness cycle implications go beyond the scope of this paper.- 4 -
2. Import Protection in Industrialized Countries
Among industrialized countries the three big trading blocs, the
USA, the EC and Japan, are still the largest steel consumers in
the world covering 15.8, 14.6 and 10.6 percent of world demand in
3
1984 . Thus, it can be expected that Brazil's overall export per-
formance depends to a high degree on import protection in these
markets. The export shares in Table 2 show that the ranking in
world consumption-is -not - reflected in the ranking of Brazil's
biggest trading partners. The USA, Japan and the EC account for
27.6, 8.7 and 3.6 percent of Brazil's steel exports in 1985. In
comparison, smaller economies such as China, Argentina and Al-
geria imported 8.6, 7.8 and 5.8 percent of Brazilian steel
exports. The EC countries, especially West Germany, have imported
less than it could have been expected on the grounds of their
huge internal market, which amounted to 14.6 and 4.9 percent of
world consumption in 1984. The question is, to which degree this
can be attributed to steel policies applied in the EC. In con-
trast, the USA absorbs the bulk of Brazilian steel exports, so
that protectionist tendencies on the U.S. market will immediately
affect Brazil's export performance. Another indication for the
impact of protectionism is due to the very different product mix
which each of the three large consumer countries imports from
Brazil. According to the notion of comparative advantage, the EC,
the USA and Japan should import similar products from Brazil
which are more labor- than techology-intensive in production. As
this is not the case, trade policies for steel products seem to
differ among industrialized countries.
2.1 Steel Trade Policy in the USA
The USA are one of the very few countries that have so far re-
frained from implementing an overall industrial policy with ex-
4
tensive regulations and subsidies . Instead, the government re-
sorted to restrictive trade policies, such as antidumping and
countervailing duties, escape clauses, and finally voluntary
export restraints (VERs). Especially the latter became importantTable 2: Brazilian Steel Exports by Kind and Country of Destination 1985

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IBS (1985); own calculations.- 6 -
after 1982, when the so-called "trigger price mechanism" (TPM)
turned out to be ineffective with respect to lowering imports .
Voluntary export restraints often emerged from the attempt of US
steel producers to receive protection against foreign suppliers
by invoking the antidumping and countervailing duty legislation.
In particular after 1982, US firms filed an increasing number of
petitions against unfair trade practices with the Department of
Commerce with the aim of restricting or at least discouraging
steel imports from "low cost" countries. During a single month,
in October 1983, U.S. producers filed 38 new antidumping and 94
countervailing duty suits. The Department of Commerce has in-
vestigated these petitions which concerned primarily imports from
the EC, South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea .
The policy consequences of these investigations into a wide range
of import categories for the 1982-1984 period are shown in Table
3 (first column).
The import restraint increases applied by the US Government have
also affected Brazilian steel exports, to the US since Brazil's
main export items (ingots, semis, sheets and tubes) were subject
to countervailing duties, quota and other restrictions on imports
of pig iron, steel tubes, and sheets.
This threat of retaliatory action induced many foreign producers
to limit the volume of their steel exports voluntarily. Thus,
there was a preference towards market-sharing agreements in order
to avoid the risks of new complaints and affirmative rulings,
although several petitions were dismissed due to insufficient
evidence . In the case of large countries, VERs were negotiated
bilaterally between governments in order to avoid trade wars.
Smaller countries, however, which have a weak bargaining po-
sition, were forced by the US industry to adhere voluntarily to
quantitative export restrictions or to face additional protec-
tionist measures. The pressure exerted on certain suppliers can- 7 -
Table 3: Trade Measures Imposed by Industrialized Countries Against Steel Imports
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Source: Anjaria, Kirmani and Petersen (1985), p. 157.- 8 -
be illustrated for the case of Brazil. Table 4 shows protective
measures proposed by the Department of Commerce as the result of
investigations carried out against the Brazilian steel exporters.
These measures were directed against all product categories,
which were of relative importance for Brazil's steel exports.
According to the data in Table 2 the proposed measures would have
covered 77 percent of Brazilian steel exports to the USA. Brazi-
lian steel exports would have lost the no longer favourable
tariff treatment granted to DCs under the General System of
Preferences (GSP). When the International Trade Commission (ITC)
was about to announce its final decision on the antidumping mar-
gins against one specific import category, carbon steel, the
Brazilian authorities proposed to negotiate an orderly market
g
agreement . The US producers accepted this negotiation offer
insisting that the new quota should be restricted to one quarter
of Brazil's 1983 export volume. As the voluntary reduction pact
failed, the US government imposed duties of more than 27 percent
g
on the respective Brazilian carbon steel imports . In the case of
stainless bars and wire rods investigations were suspended, when
the Brazilian representatives gave in and eventually agreed on
rather restrictive unilateral VERs. This example demonstrates
that countries like Brazil do not have the bargaining position to
maintain access to US markets.
Nonetheless, the US steel industry engaged in further legal acti-
vities to restrict foreign competition. In July 1983, the US
president imposed safeguard measures in the form of duty in-
creases and global quotas on the grounds of GATT Article XIX.
Protection against import competition was granted because imports
were supposed to be a source of injury to the US special steel
industry . Again, Brazil was hit as material injury was also
involved in the case of cast-iron pipe fittings. In addition, a
new escape clause petition (under Section 201 of the US Trade Act
of 1974) was filed by US firms in January 1984 in order to ge-
nerally restrict all imports of carbon and alloy steel. After an
affirmative determination of injury issued by the ITC, the US- 9 -
Table 4: US Tariff Treattnsnt of Brazilian Steel Products Subject to ITC Investigations in 1983/84
Item TSUSA
No.
Rate of Duty in Percent (1984)
Column 1 (MEW)
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Source: ITC (1983a), (1983b), (1983c), (1984a), (1984b).- 10 -
government announced the establishment of global steel quotas in
September 1984, which were based on negotiated "surge control"
arrangements with countries whose exports had increased rapidly.
This policy concerned Brazil, which in particular had increased
its steel exports to the USA by 96 percent between 1980 and 1985.
According to the US government, unfair trade practices were the
main source of injury, which had to be eliminated through bi-
lateral agreements. Except for the EC, which retained the limits
agreed upon in the 1982 US-EC steel pact, global steel arrange-
ments were negotiated with all major steel exporters. The results
are given in Table 5. The allocations of market shares . were
expected to reduce import penetration to 18.5 percent of actual
consumption, which was believed to be the "fair trade" level. For
Brazil, this allocation was equivalent to slightly over half of
its actual market share in 1983. Thus, Brazil suffered compara-
tively hard from these bilateral agreements in contrast to other
countries such as South Korea. Japan was even in a position to
negotiate a quota in excess of its market share. In absolute
terms, Brazil has been the largest loser with a quota cutting 0.7
percent of its actual market share. The quota regulation should
lead to an absolute decline of Brazilian steel exports to the USA
in subsequent years if US steel consumption continues to stag-
nate. Steel consumption in the USA has been declining at an
average annual rate of 1.5 percent between 1980 and 1985. If this
trend continues, the quota allocation to Brazil would cause an
export decline of at least 46 percent in 1986 compared to 1983.
Hence, the US market does not seem to provide much scope for an
expansion of Brazilian steel exports in the near future.
2.2 Steel Politics in the European Community
The European Community (EC) as a customs union applied a far more
restrictive approach than the USA, as the instruments provided by
the "European Community for Coal and Steel" (ECCS) agreements
facilitate interventions at all stages of the production process,- 11 -
Table 5: The 1984 Steel Pact Agreements of the USA compared with
Market Shares of Respective Countries






































































1984 values include only first nine months.
EC values are subject to the 1982 US-EC arrangement.
Source: Jones (1986), p. 152.- 12 -
namely R&D, production, distribution and investment. The ECCS
treaty enables the Commission of the EC to apply the following
measures:
1. common subsidization in the fields of R&D and social benefits;
2. setting of maximum and minimum prices;
3. implementation of common allocation schemes for production;
4. common tariffs;
5. indicative planning for investment and production.
In addition, governments of EC member countries grant national
subsidies to their steel industries, despite the explicit ban on
subsidies at the national level in the ECCS treaty.
The Federal Republic of Germany, which is the largest steel pro-
ducer in the EC, did not apply a specific steel policy. Steel
production is mainly in the hands of the private sector, which in
comparison to companies in other EC member countries has received
negligible subsidies until 1982, except for the case of Arbed
Saarstahl. Protection at the national level was only granted in
the form of subsidies to capital formation, i.e. loans at pre-
ferential terms, securities and some other instruments, as shown
in Table 6. In France, Italy and the United Kingdom subsidization
and interventionism were more common, since steel production is
dominated by a few state-owned enterprises. Thus, governments in
these countries provide equity at preferential terms, i.e. there
is no need to pay dividends.
In 1980, support at the national level was harmonized in a code
on state interventions, which aimed at progressively phasing out
subsidies in the medium term and required approval of all na-
tional measures by the Commission. Nevertheless, as it can be
seen from Table 6, subsidization in all EC member countries
reached unprecedented levels in 1984-85. Even the German govern-
ment, which had refrained so far from excessive subsidization,
began to subsidize on a broad scale. According to multilateral
decisions among the EC members, subsidies aiming at environmentalNote: These figures reflect only those subsidies as they can be obtained from the budegt of the respective countries.
For more accurate data on subsidization in the Federal Republic of Germany see Dicke and Glismann (1987).
I 2
Table 6: Released Subsidies in the European Caimunity (- in Million ECU -)
c/i
O
Subsidies for Interest Venture Capital Paid Debt/Equity Conversion Loans with Preferen- Securities, Guaran-
Payments in as Shares or Loans tial Interest Rates tees and Loans on
Market Terms
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Source: Kragenau (1986), p. 80-82; own calculations.- 14 -
protection and R&D efforts may be granted until 1990. State
support for closures of plants have been extended until 1988. In
addition, governments are allowed to cover up to 50% of the
employer's social expenditures in cases of dismissal and plant
, 11 closure
Another internal measure provided by the EC Commission comprises
the introduction of mandatory production and distribution quotas
as well as target guide prices for a number of steel products.
The mandatory quotas have been replacing the voluntary quotas set
by the privately organized EUROFER cartel, so that meanwhile most
12 products are subject to mandatory quotas . Since both production
and distribution quotas are controlled by production certificates
and accompanying documents for deliveries within the EC issued by
the administration, there is an implicit control of exports to
non-EC member countries. The system of quota allocations was to
be abolished at the end of 1987. However, in light of the pre-
vailing conditions in the European steel industry, it is likely
to be prolonged.
Through the quota system and minimum prices for some steel pro-
ducts, the EC governments are in a position to tailor production
capacities to the actual internal demand. Of course, the main-
tenance of this system requires a tight import control policy,
which comprises both voluntary agreements on export restraint and
import price thresholds. The latter are the basis for antidumping
regulations established in 1978 under strong pressure from the
Council of Ministers, and especially France, Italy, Belgium and
Luxembourg. The basic import price does not reflect the lowest
production cost on the world market, as GATT rules stipulate. The
basic import price is calculated with respect to the minimum
costs of EC producers . Since this system is only applicable for
countries, which have not entered into VERs with the EC, import
price regulations served as an "incentive" to agree on VERs. The
number of VERs agreed upon in 1978 bears witness to the "effi-
ciency" of this policy approach. In comparison to the USA, the EC
did not have to resort to antidumping investigations on a broad- 15 -
basis, as Table 3 shows. Under the bilateral arrangements,
foreign suppliers may sell at "discounted" prices which are up to
4-6 percent below basic import prices. This meant that those
countries which did not sign voluntary agreements had to sell
their steel products at the basic import prices and were hardly
14 able to compete with cheaper suppliers from other sources
In 1978 15 bilateral agreements were signed encompassing all
major suppliers to the Community. These bilateral agreements are
negotiated annually, based on expected domestic consumption and
with reference to 1980 import levels. In 1981-1983 total import
volumes were set at 12.5, 9.0 and 12.5 percent below the 1980
import level
Though the number of such bilateral agreements did not increase
between 1979 and 1984, trade volumes covered by VERs amounted to
90 percent of total EC steel imports. In 1981, Switzerland,
Portugal and South Africa have terminated their VERs, while
Brazil and Bulgaria have entered into much agreements after 1981.
Moreover, the EC has been discriminating with respect to parti-
cular groups of countries. As it can be seen from Table 7, EFTA
countries have on the whole been receiving by far the most fa-
vourable treatment. As far as total import quotas are concerned,
Socialist countries managed to achieve the highest import quotas
in 19 79, but they were soon overtaken by EFTA countries, i.e.
Austria, Spain, Sweden and Norway, which were allocated the
largest quotas (except for Japan) in 1982. In addition, countries
have to respect price discipline but for them there are no quotas
for individual steel products as they are imposed on all other
countries. Apart from that, there has been a high degree of
discrimination, as far as the conditionalities of the quota
agreement are concerned. In fact, some of the non-EFTA suppliers
are even subject to a so-called "triple clause" provision built
into their arrangements. This provision allocates imports for
specific subperiods within the duration of the arrangement (1
year), regulates the geographical distribution among EC countries- 16 -
Table 7: Import Quotas Provided in Bilateral Agreements with the

















































Source: Trautlein (1984), p. 161.- 17 -
and the volume of imports by product categories. These regula-
tions are applied with respect to import quotas exceeding 100,000
tons . Hence, the triple clause has also been applied to Brazi-
lian steel products. As a newcomer to the European market Brazil
was only granted a quota for pig iron, all other products are
subject to the import price system. Since the Commission has
emphasized its intention to maintain the present steel policy in
17 the medium-run , an increase of Brazilian exports to the EC
beyond the present level (Table 2) appears to be rather unlikely.
2.3 The Japanese Steel Policy
The close cooperation between the government and the steel in-
dustry in Japan is the main characteristic of this country's
steel approach, which is fundamentally different from steel
policies applied in the western world. The characteristic
features of this cooperation have been changing in accordance
with the development of this industry. Subsidization of capital
was granted during the infant industry and expansion phase in the
1950s and early 1960s. When steel production became a sunset
industry, thereafter the Japanese government and the producers
have been resorting to alternative means of steel support. The
government has refrained from additional direct interventions
into steel production and trade; it has rather influenced the
adjustment process through administrative guidance and so-called
"recommendations", which lack a clear legal definition. Because
of this lack of transparency the following survey of Japanese
steel policies has to remain tentative.
In contrast to other countries, Japan has refrained from subsidi-
zation of its declining steel industries. Government authorities
have rather preferred to relax their anti-trust policy and to
allow for cartellization. Shielded by import protection, cartels
facilitate cross-subsidization between certain steel products,
even though it does not necessarily delay the adjustment process.
However, overall rationalization cartels, as they were organized
in EC member countries (such as EUROFER), were never officially
founded, although there is some indication for inter-firm coope-- 18 -
ration. Since 1976", Japanese steel companies maintain their re-
spective market shares and stick to a tight price discipline. In
addition, the companies have organized a common supply of inputs.
Only specific segments of the Japanese steel industry were offi-
cially declared so-called recession cartels by the government. In
1981, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
approved the formation of a recession cartel for wrought iron
products as it had been practiced before in the past - 1974
crisis. A similar arrangement was found for the electric furnace
segment, which has also been accused of receiving state support
18 by US companies
As far as import protection is concerned, the Japanese government
was only indirectly involved by allowing for the foundation of
the Japan Iron and Steel Importers' Institute (JISII). This
institution was formed in an effort to maintain "orderly" imports
of steel products. To be able to do so, JISII is granted the
status of a monopolist importer which controls all steel imports
to Japan. In January 198 4, it has decided to reduce imports of
steel-plate as well as hot-rolled steel and coil. This action was
apparently the result of unacceptable increases in these imports
from lower-cost suppliers. Even though only 5 percent of domestic
demand were satisfied by imports in 1984, the JISII regarded 3
19 percent as adequate . Hence, steel imports from low-cost
suppliers such as South Korea and Taiwan were reduced. If import
restrictions for the above items will be applied at broader
scale, Brazilian exporters are likely to suffer, since 72 percent
of Brazilian steel exports to Japan consist of plates, hot-rolled
sheets and coils (Table 2). Since the JISII is a private purchase
institution, it can easily discriminate against particular pro-
ducer countries. It is not clear to what extent discretionary
import decisions have actually affected the Brazilian export
position. However, there can be no doubt, that a general import
reduction of these products, as envisaged by the JISII, will
seriously threaten Brazil's export capacity to Japan.- 19 -
3. Competitive Export Subsidization on the World Markets
The export capacity of the Brazilian steel industry is mainly
determined by the import protection of the large consumer
countries, as it was discussed in the previous section. However,
these countries account only for about 41 percent of Brazil's
total steel exports, as it can be seen in Table 2. Another 22
percent can be attributed to Argentina, China and Algeria. The
rest is quite equally distributed among a large number of
countries. Protectionist policies due to one of these economies
cannot affect Brazil's export standing substantially. However,
export subsidization by large countries such as Japan and the EC
members can severely undermine Brazil's competitive position on
these third-country markets.
Before analyzing the possible effects of export subsidization, it
might be helpful to derive the economic rationale for competitive
dumping. As it was discussed in the preceeding sections, a number
of industrialized countries support their steel industries
through increased subsidization. State support is in almost all
instances granted through preferential supply of capital, since
capital costs in steel producing are considerable relative to
variable costs. Because of the high physical capital intensity
and the durability of equipment (reaching up to 50 years), steel
producers regard their plants as sunk costs, once the investment
20 has been undertaken . Consequently, firms face considerable
barriers-to-exit. Assuming rationale behaviour firms as well as
profit maximization, producers are (then) in a position to reduce
their prices below marginal costs, because they realize a return
on capital as long as prices do not yet equal average variable
costs. The alternative to dumping would be a loss of all invested
capital. Subsidization offers the opportunity to reduce the price
even below that margin, since losses as well as costs of moderni-
zation of existing capital are taken over by the state. However,
due to economies of scale in production downward price flexibi-
lity is only to be expected when the producers avoid overcapaci-
ties. Declining demand and minimum price arrangements in their- 20 -
home markets, forces steel companies in industrialized countries
to increasingly use exports as an outlet for their domestic over-
capacities. Thus, even though in most industrialized countries
specific export subsidies have not been granted, it can be con-
cluded that the export performance of industrialized countries,
i.e. EC member countries and Japan (Table 9) is influenced by the
subsidies on investment which facilitates dumping. It is im-
possible to provide an empirical estimate of this influence, but
assuming that general subsidization of capital is divided equally
between exports and domestic production, state support can even
become a crucial factor.
In addition, the trade barriers in industrialized countries fa-
cilitate cross-subsidization of exports. Since anti-trust poli-
cies in industrialized countries are quite generous, as far as
cartelization of steel production is concerned, the foundation of
national and international cartels, such as the German "Verkaufs-
kontore", the Japanese Steel Exporters Association as well as
EUROFER II, have facilitated cross-subsidization even between
21 independent companies
As a result, Brazil's steel exports have to compete with sub-
sidized exports from the EC and Japan on the world market. How-
ever, it is not possible to directly determine to what extent
Brazil's export capacity is undermined through these exports,
since subsidies are non-specific with respect to the particular
products. The only fact one can state is that the product mix of
the competitors plays a decisive role for Brazil's exposure to
subsidized exports. If Brazil's steel exports are concentrated on
exactly those products, which are the main steel export products
of Japan and the EC, it is more likely that competitive export
dumping affects Brazil's trade performance. In contrast, if
Brazil specializes in those products, which have less relative
importance in the export mix of industrialized countries, it is
more likely that Brazil is not affected by export subsidization.
Thus, assuming that domestic and foreign sales of steel producers
in industrialized countries are equally benefitting from subsi-- 21 -
dization, a comparison of Brazil's export structure with those of
the industrialized countries may give a tentative answer, as to
22 what extent Brazil's exports may suffer
In order to compare the Brazilian export structure with those of
industrial economies the 1985 production-specific export quanti-
ties of Brazil, EC and Japan (Table 9 in the appendix) have been
correlated. In addition, correlation coefficients of Taiwan and
South Korea have been calculated, as they may show, to what
extent the Brazilian export structure is different from the
product mix of other NICs. A high correlation coefficient indi-
cates a high degree of similarity between the Brazilian product
mix and the export structure of the competing countries. In this
case, Brazil is likely to be seriously affected by foreign sub-
sidization. In contrast, a low or negative correlation coeffi-
cient indicates fundamental structural differences in the export
baskets. Then, foreign subsidization would not cause a loss of
competitiveness for Brazil. Table 8 reveals the correlation
matrix for Brazil, Japan and the EC for 12 specific products,
covering the entire steel exports of the respective countries.
It is obvious that Brazil's export structure is quite exceptional
in comparison to other NICs such as Taiwan and Korea. Likewise,
the correlation coefficients for Brazil are very low, or even
negative with respect to Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, the EC as
23
a whole and Japan . This shows that Brazil exports a different
product mix than both NICs and developed countries. Products
which are of relative importance in the Brazilian export basket
have less or no importance in the export basket of other coun-
tries. Of course, there is some reason to believe that the Bra-
zilian export structure is just the outcome of a crowding-out
process due to excessive competition in the world steel market.
In this case, the coefficients would indicate that the adjustment
process has already taken place in Brazil. An entirely different
picture emerges for steel exports of South Korea and Taiwan.
Steel producers in these countries face stiff competition from



































































































































Note: Exports of the European Community exclude intra-EC trade.
Sources: own calculations; for data sources see Table 9 in the appendix.- 23 -
indicate. This leads to the conclusion that (at least in 1985)
export subsidization in industrialized countries did not displace
Brazilian steel exports, but was detrimental to export expansion
in Korea and Taiwan.- 24 -
4. Brazil's Steel Exports and the Uruguay Round
As discussed in section 2, the USA and the EC have increasingly
made use of bilateral agreements. Since these arrangements have
been concluded outside the multilateral trading system provided
by GATT, world steel trade belongs to the so-called grey areas in
which GATT rules have been eroded. Bilateralism involves a clear
injury of the "most favored nation" (MFN) treatment, since the
outcome of such agreements depend on the relative political
strength of the contracting parties. As a result of their bar-
gaining power, the big trading blocs, the USA, Japan and the EC
are in a position to discriminate against politically weaker
suppliers such as Brazil. Evidence for that can be found in the
USA's treatment of Brazil concerning the VERs (see p. 8), as
compared to concessions granted to the EC. In the same vein,
Japan and the EFTA countries are given easier access to EC mar-
kets than Brazil which suffers from highly restrictive import
quotas.
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations is expected
to redress these errors of the past by strictly applying GATT
24 rules to the grey areas . However, it has to be noted that there
are other sectors than steel, in particular agriculture which is
at the centre of interest. At the moment, it seems.that steel is
not likely to be negotiated, since in most countries the steel
industry is given national priority. In addition, in most
countries steel industries are inward-oriented, while exports are
regarded as an outlet for domestic overcapacities. For this
reason, the majority of countries is interested in increased
regulation rather than liberalization of world steel trade.
In the previous GATT rounds it has been relatively easy for
developing countries to voice their demands, as they face less
obligations in the GATT agreement, especially with respect to
governmental assistance . Given the MFN treatment, countries
like Brazil were in a position to behave as a free-rider, since
any liberalization of foreign trade negotiated between the USA,
Japan and the EC would also accrue to developing countries.- 25 -
However, it is not clear to what extent this position can be
defended in the new Uruguay Round. As it was assessed in hearings
of the US Senate, the import protection granted by the Brazilian
government to its steel industry is of major importance for de-
2 6 cisions on US import protection . Hence, it can be expected that
the principle of reciprocity in trade will gain some relevance
for large NICs such as Brazil.
Reciprocity is also involved in steel trade with the EC. The
following
Commission
following criteria for LDC treatment have been developed by the
27
- contractual status of the country with respect to the communi-
ty, as there are trade and association agreements;
- economic situation and indebtedness of the country;
- amount of steel imports from the community and their respective
import treatment;
- overall trade balance with the EC.
The last two criteria stress the relevance of reciprocity. How-
ever, it is not likely that Brazil reconsiders its tight import
protection on steel, i.e. the "law of the similars". Summing up,
it has to be noted that the Uruguay negotiations cannot be ex-
pected to result in better access of Brazilian steel exports to
markets in industrialized countries.- 26 -
5. Conclusions
This paper assesses the impact of steel policies in industria-
lized countries on Brazilian steel exports. There are two major
influences:
1. access to the markets of the three big steel consuming trade
blocs, the USA, Japan and the EC, which is restricted by pro-
tectionist measures;
2. displacement of Brazilian exports on other markets due to
excessive export subsidization in industrialized countries.
As far as protectionism in large consumer countries is concerned,
it has been noted that markets in Japan and the USA have become
increasingly closed in recent years. The EC is not likely to
grant easier market access to Brazil, so that the Common Market
persists to be a less important market for Brazilian steel
exports. Nor does the U.S. market offer a field for export
expansion, since steel protection is intended to fix the present
market shares. The same does also apply to Japan. The increasing
importance of bilateralism in world steel trade is an additional
restraint for Brazilian exports, as small countries such as
Brazil face an unfavourable bargaining position against the three
large blocs. In this respect, little improvement is to be ex-
pected from the current Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, further
displacement of Brazilian exports on other markets, as it could
result from export subsidization, is not likely to occur, since
Brazil has quite a different export structure as compared to
Japan and the EC member countries. Thus, potential export
opportunities for Brazil are much more likely to be realized in
other markets than those of the three large consumers.Appendix
Table 9: Steel Exports of NICs and Industrialized Countries by Specific Products 1985 (thousand tons)
Products West France Italy United Belgium & Total EC Japan Brazil South Taiwan












































































































































Note: Coated sheets encompass tin-plates, galvanized sheets and terne plates. Special sheets cover fine stainless steel
sheets, silicon sheets and high-carbon steel sheets. Bars cover also reinforcing bars.
Sources: IISI (1986) and (1987), Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie (1986), IBS (1985).- 28 -
Footnotes
1 The causes and consequences of the world steel crisis have
been surveyed by Kohana and Kajiwara (1987).
2 For a discussion of the so-called "international roundabout of
subsidization" see Hiemenz and Weiss (1984).
3 Data can be obtained from Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und
Stahlindustrie (1986).
4 See Kragenau (1986), p. 55.
5 The TPM was a minimum price arrangement fixed to Japanese pro-
duction cost. In cases of underpricing of imports, it auto-
matically enforced antidumping measures. Despite initial price
increases, the TPM failed to improve the competitive stance of
the US steel industry, which became impatient with the ad-
ministration's apparent inability to ward off independent
antidumping complaints. The political issues concerning the
implementation of the TPM and successive measures are dis-
cussed in Jones (1986), p. 130-150.
6 See van der Ven and Grunert (1987), p. 153.
7 See Anjaria, Kirmani and Peteren (1985), p. 37.
8 The International Trade Commission is an institution within
the US Department of Commerce. The ITC is in charge of anti-
dumping, countervailing duty and material injury investi-
gations, as provided by US trade legislation.
9 For a more detailed description of this particular case see
van der Ven and Grunert (1987), p. 173-174.
10 See Anjaria, Kirmani and Petersen (1985), p. 38.
11 See Kragenau (1986), p. 56.
12 The so-called EUROFER cartel encompasses all major steel com-
panies in the EC, no matter if they are state-economic enter-
prises or private steel producers. The aim of the cartel was
to reduce production in the EC through voluntary production
quotas. Most of these quotas have been replaced by mandatory
quotas, so that EUROFER actually became redundant. However,
the cartel still fixes quotas for those products, which are
not the subject to mandatory quotas. In its present function,
it is often referred to as the so-called EUROFER II cartel.
13 The basic import price is higher than the prices negotiated in
the VERs and lower than the so-called "catalogue prices",
which the EC producers have to report to the Commission.
14 See Tsoukalis and Strauss (1987), p. 203-206.- 29 -
15 See Anjaria, Kirmani and Petersen (1984) , p. 39, for the
figures.
16 See Tsoukalis and Strauss (1987), p. 206.
17 Basic prospects concerning future EC trade policies can be
obtained from the reports of the Commission (1986) .
18 See the statement of Peabody 81984) , Chairman of the American
Iron & Steel Institute, p. 52.
19 See Peabody (1984), p. 96, 50, 42.
20 The capital costs of the equipment have to be paid, no matter
if the firm stops or continues production. These are the only
alternatives, as there is no alternative use of the equipment.
For this reason, the firm may regard its capital costs as sunk
costs. For a broader treatment of sunk costs and predatory
pricing see Scherer (1970), Chap. 12, and Aberle (1980) p. 66.
21 Evidence for cross-subsidization between independent companies
is given by Kragenau (1986).
22 An additional assumption is that up-stream and down-stream
products cannot be regarded as substitutes, since there is not
any evidence available for the case of Brazil.
23 The calculation of so-called export-overlap indices have con-
firmed these results.
24 Adlung (1987) and Dunkel (1987) give a survey on these current
negotiations in the Uruguay Round.
25 See Article XVIII of the GATT text.
26 See U.S. Senate (1984).
27 These are preliminary criteria, which have been developed in
order to be negotiated at the Uruguay Round. See Commission of
the EC (1986), p. 30-31.- 30 -
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